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Urban demographic transition
Abstract
Urban demographic transition can be defined as the historical period in 
which the population growth of cities structurally changes the settlement 
of territories. During this period, the urban population rate, which was pre-
viously very low, less than one-tenth of the population from the origins of 
humanity at least until the beginning of the 19th century, grew to be more 
than half of the population and sometimes much more. On a global average, 
the urban demographic transition was complete by 2008. Yet this transition 
is a double surprise in the history of the earth. The authors of the past had by 
no means envisaged it, and it is unprecedented in the history of the settle-
ment of our planet. It will therefore be necessary to explain the unforeseen 
process that led to it. But it is essential to understand that urbanisation is 
deployed in a very differing way according to territories and countries. Finally, 
it is important to examine the period of post-transition, which concerns all 
countries whose urbanisation rate exceeds half the total population.
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Urban demographic transition is a process that has been 
an object of analyses, even before being defined, since the 
beginning of 20th century. In 1909, A. Landry published 
a work entitled Les trois théories principales de la popu-
lation (Three main theories on population). By this title 
he meant that the new demographic regime consists of 
the third basic theory after those of T. R. Malthus1 and 
R. Cantillon2. In 1934 these findings were summarised 
(Landry 1934)3 by distinguishing three periods (regimes): 
primitive, intermediate and contemporary. In 1945, this 
idea was further developed by this author in his Traité de 
démographie. Next, F. W. Notestein proposed the term 
demographic transition within which he describes – fol-
lowing A. Landry – three phases: pre-transitional, transi-
tional and post-transitional. Starting from that baseline, 
demographic transition has been the subject of numer-
ous publications, e.g. a review study by J.-C. Chesnais 
(1986). Moreover, the notion of demographic transition 
enters scientific dictionaries (for instance Pressat 1979 
and Demopaedia). Definitions of this concept raise ques-
tions about perturbations in natality and mortality, not 
taking into consideration the spatial changes, like ur-
banisation, that can accompany them.
Taking into account the spatial dimension of demo-
graphic transition is therefore a more recent issue. It was 
developed e.g. by W. Zelinsky (1971), who came to the 
conclusion that urbanisation can be better explained by 
mobility than by the changes in mortality patterns on 
which the idea of demographic transition is based. His 
findings are limited as they may suggest that societies of 
the past did not experience mobility, which is incorrect, 
and because urbanisation also results from demographic 
transition. Studies by J. de Vries (1984), T. Dyson (2011) 
or S. Fox (2012) consider that the role of low mortality is 
essential for the phenomenon called ‘urban transition’. 
Recently, F. Moriconi-Ebrard (2015), following his pre-
vious line of thought (1993), re-defined urban transition 
by distinguishing its three phases: 
– phase A, during which the urbanisation rate is stag-
nating at a low level;
– phase B, when it rises exponentially, then 
logarithmically;
– phase C, when the urbanisation rate is stabilising 
around a certain value, typical for a particular country. 
Despite this, the term ‘urban transition’ was not 
included in the two scientific dictionaries cited above 
1. More precisely, A. Landry analyses J. Townsend and his text 
A dissertation on the poor law (1786)
2. Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général (Essay on the Nature 
of Trade in General), written before 1734, published in 1755
3. Its title, “Demographic revolution” is specifically selected for vol-
ume II of a recent publication edited by J.-P. Bardet and J. Dupâqui-
er (1999) Histoire des populations de l’Europe, Fayard, Paris, Fayard.
(Pressat 1979; Dictionnaire démographique multilingue 
2013), although ‘urban dynamics’ was the subject of study 
in numerous recent publications throughout the last two 
decades of the 20th century, even if we limit this review 
only to French literature (Claval 1981, Pumain 1982, 
Bairoch 1985, Beaujeu-Garnier, Dézert & Chelma 1991, 
Guérin-Pace 1993, Moriconi-Ebrard 1994; Wackermann 
2000a, 2000b, Moriconi-Ebrard 2001).
Based on the (inevitably incomplete) literature re-
view presented above, we can see the need to use the 
new term urban demographic transition, which could 
combine the results of studies on both demographic and 
urban transition. This is supposed to shed more light on 
factors behind the rise in the urbanisation rate observed 
since the beginning of the 19th century, resulting from the 
combination of these two transitions, at the same time 
from changes in mortality and natality patterns as well 
as migration. In other words, without migration and 
especially: rural emigration, the increase in the urban-
isation rate would not have been that high. However, its 
significance would have been much lower, too, without 
the decrease in the mortality rate. Thus, the aim of this 
paper is to discuss the formulation of urban demographic 
transition by explaining its historical and geographical 
significance.
An unexpected and novel phenomenon
In the preceding centuries, even in the early 20th cen-
tury, no author anticipated the tremendous growth in 
the rate of urbanisation that the world has experienced 
since then.
A totally unforeseen urbanisation
Among the great authors of antiquity, Plato expresses 
the clearest rejection of urbanisation. According to him, 
the order that should reign in the city needs the demo-
graphic stability of the urban population. Plato presents 
a set of public measures for “adjusting the number of 
households to the number of five thousand forty” (Plato, 
The Law, V).
The first scientific work (Graunt 1977) discussing pop-
ulation4, published in 1662, describes a big European city: 
London. Its author, John Graunt – “a citizen of London” 
(as he introduces himself) – tries not simply to count 
the population by means of statistical works. Above all, 
he aims to examine the relationships between the large 
concentration of population within the city and its envi-
ronment. By this study, he completes a task that no-one 
4. For sure not calling it ‘demography’ which is a term invented 
by Achille Guillard in 1855 for describing a science that was called 
‘political arithmethic’ for a long time, e.g. in the encyclopedias of 
Diderot and d’Alembert
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undertook before him, which is –as he indicates with 
great modesty in the title of his book– “observations 
made upon the bills of mortality.”
J. Graunt creates, based on sources that were not dedi-
cated to this, demographic information that is terrifying 
from a contemporary perspective. These facts reveal that 
not only the mortality in London was extremely high5: 
“around 36% of the conceived individuals died before 6 
years old” (Graunt 1977: 63), but also – that it was higher 
than in the countryside.
One of the reasons behind that is linked to the insa-
lubrious air in the city. J. Graunt defines a “insalubrious 
year” as one when “the number of funerals exceeds the 
one reported in the preceding year and when there are no 
more than 200 deaths because of plague (since we name 
the years of plague as those where the relevant number is 
exceeded)”. However, there are also “insalubrious years” 
with a significant mortality due to “dysentery, called by 
some people the intestinal plague”. Moreover, “among all 
the diseases and causes of death, the plague is the most 
important one. In London, there were four periods of 
high mortality within our era: 1592, 1603, 1625 and 1636”. 
For instance, in 1603, 82% of buried individuals were dead 
of the plague (Graunt 1977: 79–85).
Despite annual variations of the mortality rate due 
to the degree of insalubrity or intensity of the plague, 
London showed a general over-mortality when compared 
to its surroundings. The investigation of the demographic 
characteristics of the city leads John Graunt to the follow-
ing conclusion: the city is less healthy than the country-
side (Graunt 1977: 114). The possible reasons for this situa-
tion are “smokes, vapours and stinks”. In this context, the 
city of London – whose population is estimated by John 
Graunt as around 384 000 inhabitants (Graunt 1977: 105) 
– is anyway growing thanks to “the immigration of the 
provincial people”. This compensates for natural growth, 
which is lower than in the countryside, and even often 
negative, because of excess urban mortality. 
In addition, John Graunt writes: ‘I asked myself 
whether a city becomes more insalubrious as its popu-
lation grows, just because of that. I am inclined to believe 
that London is nowadays more insalubrious than it was 
before, partly because it is more populated but most of 
all, because – as I have heard – 60 years ago people used 
to burn less coal, which is now a common practice’. Thus, 
this part of the text indicates that a city, because of high 
population density, consumes a lot of fossil energy on 
a limited surface area, thus creating pollution. This pro-
duces – compared to the countryside – more insalubrity 
and excess mortality.
5. Which was, incidentally, the case for most areas in this era 
According to John Graunt, the development of urban-
isation based almost exclusively on immigration (which 
has both a direct and indirect (due to their fecundity) 
influence on the number of inhabitants), will necessar-
ily becomes a self-limiting process as living conditions 
will worsen along with the growing urban population, 
especially due to pollution coming from the rising con-
sumption of energy. However, from the beginning of the 
19th century, urbanisation, a novel phenomenon in the 
history of humanity, has been intensifying. 
A phenomenon with no historical antecedents
Indeed, during the 19th and 20th centuries there are 
two symbolic dates for the development of urbanisation 
marking new thresholds of urban settlement: 1840 and 
1929. In 1840, the City of London, as the first ever conur-
bation, achieved a population of 2 million inhabitants. 
Less than one century later, New York had more than 10 
million and could be therefore called a ‘metropolis’. If we 
consider the 21st century as well, one more date can be 
pointed out in this respect: 2008, when the urbanisation 
rate exceeded 50% (Fig. 1). That is, more people nowadays 
live in cities than in rural areas.
Thus, the Earth’s population faces a major structural 
change within less than two centuries. In 1800, it was 
almost entirely rural, with only 8% of people living in 
towns and cities6. The urbanisation of the world started 
very slowly. In the 19th century, it was limited basically 
to those countries, which faced a transformation from 
a rural to industry-based economy, especially in Europe 
and North America. In these areas, the change from the 
rural – or primary sector – world to an industrial one 
represents a major factor in urbanisation as a result of 
the concentration of economic activities in the vicinity 
of energy sources.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the world’s av-
erage urbanisation rate was still very low, as it did not 
exceed 16%. In the same period, we have only four ‘big cit-
ies’, that is, ones with more than two million inhabitants. 
6. Among the numerous definitions of a city, the most relevant ones 
highlight population features, that is, number of inhabitants and 
considerable population density. This double demographic dimen-
sion of a city, expressed in numbers and population density, is due to 
its habitat type, which is noted e.g. by one of the most famous sociol-
ogists, M. Weber (1921), who writes: „The city does not consist of one 
or more houses located separately, it is, in any case, a concentrated 
(at least relatively) habitat, a “locality”. In cities (but not only there), 
houses are built very close to each other; besides today the general 
rule is to build them wall against wall” (Weber 1982: 17).  
One of the additional clarifications provided by M. Weber’s analysis 
is the degree of reciprocal knowledge among the inhabitants. The 
city is “a collection of adjoining houses, in close rank, which forms, 
in one piece, a vast conglomeration so that the ordinary and specific 
grouping of the neighbourhood, characterised by the personal and 
reciprocal knowledge of the inhabitants, is lacking” (Weber 1982: 18).
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They are: the London conurbation, New York, Berlin 
and Paris. However, they are really exceptions in a world 
with dominance of the primary sector and a share of 
rural population of more than 4/5 of the planet’s popula-
tion. The demographic significance of London, Paris and 
Berlin can be explained by their functions as capitals of 
industrialised countries and important colonial empires, 
while New York serves as a main harbour for millions of 
Europeans emigrating to North America.
Then, during the first half of the 20th century, ur-
banisation became a more universal phenomenon. The 
number of big cities grew from four in 1900 to thirty 
seven in 1950. The majority of them were found in coun-
tries that are nowadays perceived as developed: of the 
four conurbations mentioned above, we should add, for 
instance, Tokyo, the built-up area of the Ruhr region, 
Osaka, Chicago, Moscow, Buenos Aires (Argentina was 
one of the richest countries in the world), Manchester, 
Los Angeles or Boston. 
As for the developing areas, the phenomenon of big 
cities was unknown there until 1900. Their emergence re-
sults from, on the one hand, the growth of urban centres 
in which the population already exceeded 500,000 at the 
beginning of 20th century, while on the other, from the 
rapid development of small and medium towns. Among 
the examples of the former, we can list e.g. Calcutta and 
Bombay in India, Shanghai and Beijing in China or Cairo 
in Egypt, while the latter group includes e.g. Manila 
(population multiplied by 11 between 1900 and 1950), 
the Shenyang-Fushun conurbation in China (multiplied 
by 11) or Mexico City (8.6 times).
At the same time, the ‘big cities’ phenomenon con-
tinued in areas where it had already been observed: 
between 1900 and 1950 the population of New York was 
multiplied by 3.8 and in the case of London – by 3.3. 
These numbers (in net values) are still higher than the 
world average. The world’s population increased during 
this period from 1,650 million up to 2,524 million in 
1950, so it multiplied by 1.5. The number of inhabitants 
of Paris and Berlin, in spite of two world wars and low 
fertility rates following the end of demographic transi-
tion, had anyway grown by 80% and 40%, respectively. 
As a consequence, the average global urbanisation rate 
rose from 13% in the first half of the 20th century up to 
29.6% in 1950 (Fig. 2).
In the second half of the 20th century we observed the 
continuation of this trend, with the urbanisation rate 
achieving 46.6% in 2000. The process of urbanisation 
further multiplied the number of inhabitants of cities and 
towns from 256 million in 1900 to 746 million in 1950, 
so with a multiplication by 2.9 times within 50 years. 
During the following five decades, the number of city 
and town dwellers increases 3.9 times reaching 2,856 
million in 2000. In total, the urban population was mul-
tiplied by a factor of 11 during the 20th century while the 
global population only multiplied by a factor of 3.9. In 
2008 the urban and rural populations were equal, with 
each amounting to 3,400 million. Starting from 2016, the 
number of city and town dwellers has exceeded 4 billion 
and now constitutes 54% of the world’s population, even 
if these figures should be relativized7. 
A demographic analysis is needed of the mechanism 
of this unexpected and novel phenomenon of urbanisa-
tion that has been noticeable since the beginning of the 
19th century, and which is called the scheme of urban 
demographic transition.
A two-stage process
In fact, the significance of urbanisation should be con-
sidered in a more general demographic context, which 
explains its main feature, which is that it consists of two 
stages (Fig. 3). This process – analogically to demograph-
ic transition8 – is called ‘urban demographic transition’. 
The first stage of urban demographic transition
Before the urban transition, in a rural economy based 
on agriculture that was dominant worldwide until the 18th 
century, the urbanisation rate was very low, usually lower 
than 5%, in most countries. The demographic evolution 
of cities of this era included periods of stagnation, lim-
ited growth or decline resulting from the local situation 
and the development of civilisations. A few demograph-
ically important cities existed in Europe and Asia, like 
e.g. Paris, London or Beijing. However, there are neither 
megalopolises nor even big cities if we consider as the 
latter those with more than 2 million inhabitants. Thus, 
cities maintain a limited demographic dimension during 
the whole period. 
Then, the beginning of demographic transition also 
meant a rise in the urbanisation rate. This may be ex-
plained by three factors among which the first two are 
closely linked. Firstly, while cities used to be places of 
depopulation9, they now start to register a positive – 
sometimes high – rate of natural population increase. 
7. International urban statistics are based on national definitions of 
urban population which are heterogenous and therefore should be 
critically examined (e.g. Dumont & Chalard 2010)
8. A period of various duration and intensity, when the population 
undergoes a change from a demographic regime of high birth and 
mortality rates, to a regime characterised by a low mortality and 
then a low birth rate
9. We should distinguish here the two notions: ‘depopulation’ 
meaning that we register more deaths than births within a given 
area, and ‘population decline’, which means that we observe a de-
crease in number of inhabitants of a given area (Dictionnaire de 
géographie 2005).
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figure 1 
The world’s urbanisation rate (based on exact data and then averages of forecasts) 
Source: author based on United Nations data: WUP – The 2014 Revision
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figure 2 
The world’s urban and rural populations [in millions of inhabitants] (based on exact data and then average forecasts) 
Source: author based on UN: WUP – The 2014 revision of the WUP
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This is most of all due to the decrease in the mortality 
rate following progress in medicine, pharmaceuticals, 
hygiene etc. Secondly, mortality rates decrease more 
rapidly in cities, as the diffusion of the progress men-
tioned above is also quicker there due to the concentra-
tion of population. Finally, urbanisation benefits from 
rural-urban migration. To sum up, as they enter the ur-
ban demographic transition, cities added an increased 
migratory input to an essentially new phenomenon of 
a constant natural increase of population. 
The first cause for the increase in the population of 
cities is, of course, the demographic transition. The 
decline in mortality – of infants, children and women 
during childbirth in particular – improves the survival 
and life expectancy rates of city and town dwellers, and 
therefore augments the urban population. Contrary to 
the anxiety concerning the further worsening of the sit-
uation in London10 expressed in 1662 by John Graunt, 
the population of this city was continuously growing. 
Along with a parallel increase in energy consumption, 
the improvement of living conditions in cities and more 
hygienic habits of their inhabitants allow a dramatic re-
duction in the mortality factors in London identified by 
John Graunt: smallpox, chickenpox, measles, parasites 
and plague. Against the overall background, the results 
are marvellous: the urban environment, transformed by 
human effort and innovation as well as a more hygienic 
lifestyle, no longer has all the deadly impacts on its pop-
ulation that it had before. 
The second factor tells us that, as we can learn from 
the history of demography, the environmental con-
ditions improved more quickly and progress against 
insalubrity was faster in cities and towns than in the 
countryside. In developed countries (but even in oth-
ers), the first stage of the urban demographic transition 
is the period during which the relative excess mortality 
moves from the cities to the countryside. In fact, the 
concentration of people in cities facilitated the estab-
lishment and profitability of infrastructure and services 
that could rapidly reduce mortality, and all that consti-
tuted what John Graunt called ‘insalubrity’. At the same 
time, the implementation of environmentally friendly 
arrangements took place later in the rural areas of the 
same countries.
The decline of morbidity and mortality of the ur-
ban population is particularly associated with the es-
tablishment of infrastructure, which closely respected 
the rules of hygiene. We speak here mainly about water 
and sanitation systems. The best evidence for the overall 
10. The London conurbation had more than 8 million of in-
habitants in 2015, so more than twenty times more than in 
1662 (384 000).
improvement in the cleanliness of air and water in the 
city was the decline in urban mortality and the increase 
in life expectancy. If human activities in cities had re-
mained as polluting as in previous centuries, this pollu-
tion would have had very significant health effects, for 
example multiplying the spread of endemic diseases and 
causing high mortality.
For sure, at the beginning of the 19th century, cities 
such as Paris or London experienced hygiene problems 
that seemed impossible to solve and that transformed the 
rivers that cross them into immense cesspits. However, 
this was followed by large-scale development of urban 
technical infrastructure. The quality of water drunk by 
urban dwellers was greatly improved by the supply of 
drinking water, which in turn limited the pollution of 
the water table. Hygiene is supported by an increase in 
per capita water consumption. The problem of the emp-
tying of pits, which had become too frequent due to an 
increase in the population density, was regulated with 
the spread of septic tanks. 
In those cities that were in the forefront of progress, 
storm water and domestic wastewater from buildings 
was conveyed to the sewer from 1850 onwards. In Paris, 
the major construction works conducted by Baron 
Haussmann concentrated on this issue. ‘In 1852, an in-
habitant of Paris has 110 litres of water at his disposal, 
in 1869 – 175 litres and when the Vanne aqueduct be-
gan operation – 225 litres... Between 1852 and 1869, the 
services of the city established nearly 842 kilometres 
of pipes that add to the 705 kilometres of the old Paris’ 
(Carmona 2000: 520–521). Studying the technical in-
frastructure of the city, M. du Camp underlined that 
‘It is contemporary Paris that started this enormous 
movement towards urban hygiene which the others will 
study and then implement to obtain the same bene-
fits. The construction of the underground pipeline in 
the city, initiated by Mr. Belgrand, in order to deliver 
drinking water and to expel soiled waters, would suf-
fice to illustrate an era and a nation. Science has nev-
er before reached a higher level in responding to the 
needs of public health’ (du Camp 1870 after: Carmona 
2000: 523). One more innovation supporting a good 
urban environment in Paris was introduced in 1894: 
from then on, human excrement was mainly evacuat-
ed using pipelines, which took the collective name of 
sewerage (Dupuy 1992: 32).
The third factor in the growth of big cities is linked 
with the process of rural-urban migration11. We can list 
its various mechanisms, e.g.:
11. It should be mentioned that some areas, like the Vendée in 
France, have hardly experienced any rural emigration, as they man-
aged to provide jobs in industries based in the countryside.
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– departure of active farmers towards towns and cities, 
where industry is developed;
– departure of those who have no hope for employment 
in agriculture, following the increase in productivity 
in the primary sector;
– development of employment in the tertiary sector, 
which is mostly based in towns and cities;
– economic and fiscal policies discouraging agricultural 
production and limiting its profitability;
– tendencies of centralisation in the spatial management 
of territories, maintaining a contrast to a sustainable 
and balanced development; 
– absence or insufficient number of agrarian reforms 
that would support active farmers.
Usually, rural-urban migration is forced rather than 
desired. Farmers pin their hopes for better living condi-
tions on their departure to big cities. When immigrat-
ing there, they enlarge the city’s demographic but also 
physical dimensions, by settling down in peripheral 
areas, which is legal in developed countries and often 
initially illegal in developing ones. Rural-urban migra-
tion is stimulated by the modernisation of agriculture 
and the more attractive image of a city as having more 
support from the political authorities of a country and 
providing more opportunities, including those con-
nected with social advancement (these hopes, however, 
usually end up in disappointment). Fortunately, this mi-
gration is not sterile, which is a significant demographic 
factor. By contrast, the social group of rural migrants 
is usually to a great extent composed of young adults, 
who therefore contribute to the cities’ rate of natural 
increase of population.
As a consequence of the three above-mentioned fac-
tors, population growth in cities during the first phase 
of the urban demographic transition leads to a greater 
increase in the population growth rate than in the coun-
try as a whole. At the global level, the urbanisation rate 
increased from 29.6% in 1950 up to 41.2% in 1985, when – 
still on average – the first stage of the urban demographic 
transition ends.
figure 3 
Stages of the urban demographic 
transition 
 
Explanations: b – the beginning 
of transition; b–e – the first stage 
of the transition; e–h – the second 
stage of the transition;  
e – the beginning of deceleration 
of urban growth; 
b–h – total duration of the 
transition.  
 
Source: author based on UN: The 
2014 revision of the WUP
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The second stage of the urban demographic transition
When the reasons behind urban growth started to 
recede, a number of big cities recorded a deceleration of 
their demographic development. This is called the second 
stage of the urban demographic transition. The increased 
rate of growth of the urban population declines (Fig. 4). 
The increase of the urbanisation rate, which used to be 
continuous, slows down. On the one hand, the natural 
increase in cities diminishes as the demographic tran-
sition accelerates. Moreover, the decline in fecundity is 
often observed earlier and is more intense in urban areas 
than in the countryside, both in the countries of the global 
‘North’ and the ‘South’ (Garenne 2017a: 34; 2017b). On the 
other hand, the pace of rural-urban migration is declining.
The growth of cities resulting from urban-rural migra-
tion definitely has its limits. It reduces, in relative terms, 
as urban areas lose their significance in relation to the 
countryside, due to the simple fact that there is a decrease 
in rural population susceptible to migrate to the city. For 
the majority of rural areas, net emigration to the cities is 
usually equivalent of the net immigration that the urban 
areas receive. While the latter areas gain a relative weight, 
for the same rate of emigration from the rural world, the 
number of migrants contributing to urban growth de-
creases. This observation is essential and when ignored, 
may lead to a situation similar to the case of Mexico. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, projections were prepared which 
assumed 30 million inhabitants for Mexico City – which 
was therefore to become the most populous city in the 
world. Contrary to these projections, its real growth has 
proven to be much weaker (Chalard & Dumont 2008).
By passing through the two above-mentioned stages, 
the urban demographic transition transforms mostly-ru-
ral populations into mostly-urban ones. Countries that 
have undergone this process then enter the post-transi-
tion period of the urban demographic transition.
Starting from the end of the urban demographic 
transition, the rate of increase of the urban population 
steadily declines. As a consequence, the gap between 
the rate of increase of urban populations and the total 
population declines.
According to the data provided by the United Nations 
(2015: 252–262), the beginning of the second stage of the 
urban demographic transition may be dated to the mid-
1980s, as this is when, on the global average, the rate of 
increase of the urban population started to decline. For 
sure, the UN registered an ephemeral growth in this 
respect between 2000 and 2005; however, this can be ex-
plained by the Chinese policy on urbanisation (Dumont 
& Yiliminuer 2014) and the effects of metropolisation 
specified in the following chapters. In conclusion, we 
can assume that – at a global level – the second stage of 
the urban demographic transition ended in 2008 with 
the urbanisation rate exceeding 50%. 
However, progress in the urban demographic transi-
tion varies considerably between countries.
figure 4 
The rate of increase 
of the world’s urban 
population (annual 
average) 
Source: author 
based on UN: WUP 
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Considerable diversity of time sequencing 
and intensity
The time sequence is the first element of variation in 
the urban demographic transition between countries. On 
one hand, the beginning varies from the end of the 17th 
century (the United Kingdom), through e.g. the 1920s in 
the case of India, up to the 1950s for numerous African 
countries. These differences can also be illustrated by 
taking one separate year as an example, for instance 1950 
(United Nations 2015: 204–214), when the urban demo-
graphic transition is almost completed in countries with 
an urbanisation rate exceeding 70% such as Belgium, 
the United Kingdom or Australia. At the same time, the 
whole process is only starting, with around a 10% level, in 
Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Laos or Afghanistan 
and is in progress in South Korea or China, where it is 
going to end in 1975 and 2010, respectively. 
The differences in evolution of the urbanisation rates 
during the urban demographic transition can mainly be 
explained by the influence of international migrations as 
well as political and geopolitical factors.
Thus, international migratory flows can modify the 
demographic situation, depending on their destination 
and preferential choices for large cities. In Europe or 
North America, these flows have concentrated in urban 
centres. For instance, in France almost 40% of foreign 
immigrants settle in the region of Île-de-France and as 
a consequence immigrants constitute 17% of this region’s 
population, compared to the average of 8.1% for the whole 
country (Dumont 2008).
The world’s urbanisation also depends on factors such 
as military conflicts, which often stimulate the growth 
of big cities. We can refer to numerous examples of such 
influence, for instance:
• Paris during WW1, receiving people and activities 
from Eastern France, which resulted in a demographic 
growth contrasting with the overall rate of decrease 
for France
• Athens right after WW2, facing an inflow of refugees 
escaping from the Greek countryside perturbed by 
the civil war
• Calcutta, receiving hundreds of thousands of refugees 
after the Partition of Bengal between West Bengal and 
East Pakistan in 1947
• Taipei, which built its demographic weight on the in-
flow of emigrants from the Chinese mainland who 
opposed communist expansion and then rejected the 
regime instituted in 1949
• Seoul, welcoming refugees from North Korea after the 
Korean war
• Lima, being a refuge for many Peruvians leaving en-
dangered areas during the civil war of the Shining Path 
• Cali, where whole districts emerged based on refugees 
who escaped from areas subjected to the terror of the 
armed revolutionary forces in Columbia
• Istanbul, with its large Kurdish population, who 
moved away from the east of the country, an area 
where the Turkish army had been operating.
We should add to this list also other kinds of political 
factor. The development of political regimes based on 
national countries often gives priority to capital cities, 
which is usually encouraged by governments and ob-
served even in the case of countries whose constitutions 
provide for federal systems, such as Argentina or Mexico. 
The concentration of political power usually enhances 
the concentration of economic power by encouraging big 
private companies to establish their headquarters close 
to political decision-makers, who constantly influence 
the evolution of markets through legislative decisions 
and regulations.
Thus, even if the process of urban demographic tran-
sition is (or used to be) common worldwide, the value 
of the urbanisation rate can never be explained by one 
universal factor. The geography of urbanisation and its 
evolution depend equally on the history of migration, as 
well as geopolitics and national policies.
However, once the process of urban demographic 
transition is completed, what happens afterwards? In 
order to answer this question, we need to examine the 
urbanisation situation and its prospects in the post-tran-
sitional period.
The situation and prospects of urbanisation in the 
post-transitional period
Those countries that were first to complete their urban 
demographic transition have experienced a continuous 
increase in their urbanisation rate, mainly due to per-
sistent rural-urban migration and the employment op-
portunities in the tertiary sector provided by big cities. 
Next, in the 1990s in particular, this increase could be 
stimulated by a new process: metropolisation. Howev-
er, this does not mean that the urban world is going to 
gradually absorb a growing part of the rural world, as 
indicated by the UN’s average projection where an urban 
population rate of 66% was predicted in 2050 against 50% 
in 2008 (United Nations 2015: 204–214). In fact, urbani-
sation can equally meet its limits due to various factors.
Metropolisation: a new driving force behind 
urbanisation?
Starting in the 1990s, a new context of globalisation 
and internationalisation (Dumont 2001) has strength-
ened a new urbanisation factor, called metropolisation. 
This phenomenon, known worldwide, is a characteristic 
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feature of developed, industrial and emerging countries. 
It is closely linked with recent public policies concerning 
openness to international trade, as well as innovations in 
transport and communication, and finally the actions of 
economic stakeholders.
Metropolisation can be defined as a ‘result of the ac-
tion of centripetal forces leading to the [further] concen-
tration of economic activities, especially higher tertiary 
functions, and people in the most populous urban spaces’ 
(Dumont 1994). As a result, metropolises can absorb ac-
tivities that produce wealth as well as gain some economic 
power. According to their institutional status (national/
regional capital, headquarters of international public in-
stitutions), they also have political power at their dispos-
al, as well as the capacity for good governance provided 
by their leaders. Metropolisation can also be explained 
by tertiarisation of the economy, with an over-representa-
tion of tertiary job opportunities within metropolises, 
especially if we bear in mind that non-material activities 
dominate over material production when we consider the 
production of wealth. The fact that international compa-
nies largely tend to establish their foreign offices in big 
cities constitutes one more factor in metropolisation.
Urbanisation is therefore enhanced by the process 
of metropolisation, which is strongly related to various 
political, geographical and managerial factors of globali-
sation (Dumont 2015a). In brief, urbanisation is a spatial 
consequence of globalisation, characterised by a strong 
selection of locations for economic activities.
Limits of urbanisation
However, in numerous countries of the so-called glob-
al North, we can also observe the depopulation of cities 
(Michniewicz 2005, Chalard 2007, Fol 2010), sometimes – 
but not always – partly compensated for by the growth of 
other cities. Is it possible that we are going to face the end 
of urbanisation, even though the process will probably 
still continue in countries that have not yet completed 
their urban demographic transition? This question is 
justified for at least two reasons. Firstly, the effects of 
metropolisation vary considerably between territories. 
Secondly, there are many examples showing that inno-
vations are not exclusively connected with metropolises 
(Dumont 2013, 2017).
The answer to the abovementioned question depends 
on numerous political, economic and social circumstanc-
es. Urbanisation can be limited by various factors, e.g.:
• public policies focused more on the development of 
rural areas, not metropolises;
• the rapid development of distance working facilitated 
by a worldwide popularisation of digital devices;
• the creation of added value in the countryside as well 
as towns, either through innovation or the revival of 
traditional products, with their commercialisation or 
the reintroduction of their usage (Dumont 2016);
• better governance and promotion policies in rural 
areas;
• the search for amenities that encourage people to re-
main in the countryside or to move there.
To clarify the question of the possibility of a ‘ceiling’ or 
an end to urbanisation, we can take one country – France 
– as an example. The urban demographic transition, that 
is, the period of urban population gaining domination 
over a rural population, was completed – according to 
the official data provided by the French statistical office 
(Insee) – in the 1930s.
As a result, France at the beginning of the 21st centu-
ry, as described by these numbers, appears to be a very 
urbanised country with more than ¾ of its inhabitants 
living in cities and towns. Nevertheless, the latest data 
reveal stagnation in urbanisation and undoubtedly hide 
regression. In addition to this, other analyses suggest that 
the urbanisation of France is overestimated.
In France, starting from the beginning of the indus-
trial revolution of the early 19th century, the urbanisation 
rate (that is, the ratio between the number of people living 
in cities and towns and the rest of the total population) 
has considerably increased because of numerous reasons 
relating to the logic of urban demographic transition:
• activities in the industrial sector have initially been 
concentrated in the vicinity of energy resources, en-
gendering urban growth in areas that could provide 
these;
• rural emigration has been widespread in areas that 
could not offer jobs in industry or in services, which 
would compensate for diminishing employment in 
agriculture due to its increase in productivity;
• the development of the tertiary sector, including both 
its commercial (enterprises) and non-commercial 
(state administration, local authorities and hospitals) 
dimension, mainly occurs in cities (for instance, the 
number of public administration workers is clearly 
correlated with the number of inhabitants of an area);
• some companies choose an urban location due to the 
cities’ potential to absorb more consumers or their 
geographical advantages linked to transport networks.
As a result, the urbanisation rate of metropolitan 
France – as registered by the Insee – grew from less than 
10% at the beginning of the 19th century to 77.5% in 2007. 
The latest data reveal, however, stagnation in this respect 
starting from the beginning of the 2010s. It seems that 
with a value of 77.5%, the urbanisation rate has reached 
its limits, as the rate of demographic increase in rural 
areas has become higher (in net values) than in cities and 
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towns, which is mostly due to the attractiveness of the 
countryside. This situation can be very well illustrated on 
the basis of the examples of several departments, which, 
after a 150-year experience of outflow of their inhabitants 
to cities, nowadays register a positive net migration rate 
(Dumont & Yiliminuer 2015). The departments of Creuse, 
Aveyron and Cantal have become areas of immigration 
since 1975, 1990 and 1999, respectively.
By contrast, the urban unit of Paris has been unat-
tractive since 1975. Its migration system is paradoxical: 
apart from a great number of – especially international 
– immigrants, we observe that more and more people 
move away from the French capital and that this trend is 
reinforced every year. That is why every year it registers 
a negative net migration rate of ca. 50,000 persons. These 
people leave for abroad, other French urban municipali-
ties, but also for the countryside.
Nevertheless, we could ask if the above-mentioned 
stagnation of the urbanisation rate is not indeed depopu-
lation. In fact, what Insee did in 2010 in order to measure 
the extent of the urban area was a further extension of 
the ‘principle of 200 metres’ (distance between buildings), 
based on which a piece of land is considered as a built-up 
area. At the moment, some particular public spaces (cem-
eteries, stadiums, airports, parking lots etc.), industrial or 
commercial areas (factories, industrial estates, shopping 
centres) are considered as built-up areas, which means 
that they may link inhabited zones based on the 200 
metres principle, while previously they were simply not 
included in the calculation of the open space distances. 
This change in the calculation method caused a growth 
in the surface area of certain urban units, even though 
no structural change had in fact taken place there12.
However, some recent publications of Insee consider 
a possible overestimation of the urban population (Insee 
2015a; 2015b: 14; Dumont 2015b). A calculation method 
developed in Europe (Eurostat 2015) also based on mor-
phological characteristics, indicates an urbanisation rate 
of 66.2% for metropolitan France – that is, more than 
10 percentage points lower than Insee. The respective 
number drops further to 41.7% (so 35.8 points below the 
official French statistics!) if we consider as non-urban 
areas of an intermediate population density.
Moreover, the European typology confirms that the 
rate of increase is higher in the case of rural areas than 
cities. In addition to this, the demographic growth of 
communes with a low population density is 60% higher 
12. For instance, these statistical principles of Insee led to a fusion 
(within the new delimitation of 2010) of the urban municipalities 
of Lyon and Villefranche-sur-Saône, which had been separated 
– based on the old delimitations – by rural areas which can been 
easily observed e.g. when travelling along the A6 highway
than of those with an intermediate density. And there 
again, only 21% of the area of the latter is urbanised.
Certainly, the demographic evolution of French cities 
is full of contrasts and so is e.g. the job market (Poupard 
2015), however, their average population increase is lower 
than the respective numbers for the country as a whole. 
The general contemporary image could be summarised 
as follows: the urban sphere has become generally repel-
lent, while the rural – generally attractive (Guieysse & 
Rebour 2012, Pistre 2013). Bearing this in mind, we have 
to point out a paradox that all recent French laws con-
cerning spatial management (Dumont 2015c) – adopted 
either by right- or the left-wing parties – are based on the 
idea of an overwhelming urbanisation, while in fact the 
latter seems to lose its importance nowadays.
Thus, after the urban demographic transition, which 
includes, in every case, an easily distinguished period 
during which a largely rural society becomes predomi-
nantly urban, the process of urbanisation may evolve in 
various directions. We can refer here to two examples: 
conurbations such as London, which registered a de-
crease in population in the 1960s, and New York, where 
the same was observed in the 1970s. Next, starting from 
the 1990s, the process of metropolisation stimulated the 
return of the trend to an increase in the case of coun-
tries including one or more metropolises with a strong 
attractiveness in the political, economic or migratory 
dimension. Nevertheless, the dynamics of metropolises 
vary worldwide and so is their impact on urbanisation 
rates. The future of urbanisation is therefore not clear, 
as its geography results from a combination of factors, 
including a city’s capacity to meet the objectives of sus-
tainable development.
Conclusion
When we look at the process of urbanisation within 
a framework of general logic, highlighted by the pat-
tern of urban demographic transition, the urbanisation 
rates of particular countries have followed or follow very 
differing rhythms. These differences depend on the pace 
of economic or social transformations as well as the polit-
ical, geographical and cultural characteristics of a coun-
try, with their various impacts on spatial development. 
Thus, the time sequence and intensity of urban demo-
graphic transition have varied or vary to a great extent 
between countries and regions of the world.
At the beginning of the 21th century, due to the in-
crease in urbanisation, the world has never before seen 
so many big cities, or the size of the largest of them. 
The urban phenomenon illustrates considerable change 
induced by the evolution of the economy, sanitary pro-
gress, as well as the political choices of the past two 
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centuries. The Earth’s human population, still predom-
inantly rural in the 18th century and with a low life ex-
pectancy at birth, leaves room, in the 21th century, for 
societies living in concentrated settlements where the 
average longevity has considerably increased. Moreover, 
worldwide population growth is in any case reached 
through differences in density between territories rather 
than by means of an even population density. This is 
a reason for a paradoxical evolution of our contempo-
rary history: the human population has never been this 
large before and, at the same time, it has never been as 
concentrated to the same extent in urban areas that con-
stitute a marginal percentage of the planet’s surface. The 
future of urbanisation suggests two possible scenarios: 
either a further intensification of this paradox or – on 
the contrary – its regression.
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